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Time for peace
A year since negotiations to
end the armed conflict in Colombia opened in Havana
Sergio Alejandro Gómez
IF
something has become clear during the more than 50
years of war in Colombia it is that peace is not
subject to a calendar, not a question of sitting
around, waiting for a final end to the gunfire.
However, dates are unavoidably a good opportunity to
take stock of events which are prolonged in time.
Representatives of the Juan Manuel Santos government
and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-Army
of the People (FARC-EP) first sat down at the
negotiating table in Havana on November 19, 2012.
What
has been the outcome of these 365 days? There is no
easy answer to this question, in the first place, no
one knows the exact steps required to reach peace.
Precisely what has been discussed in marathon
sessions at Havana’s International Convention Center
is the way to attain an end to the conflict. Each
new step taken along that way is making history.
What
is clearer is how peace is not made. Colombians have
been present at various fruitless peace processes
since the beginning of the conflict, during the
governments of Belisario Betancur (1982-1986) and
Virgilio Barco (1986-1990), to those of César
Gaviria (1990-1994) and Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002).
The
Havana talks were constructed in the shadow of these
failures.
The
current experience of seeking peace was only made
public after discussions to produce a six-point
agenda to guide the talks were concluded. In Caguán,
with Pastrana, valuable months were lost in reaching
that point, while the media offensive tore both
groups to shreds.
This
time the venue is in a neutral country, Cuba,
relatively isolated from the context of national
politics, and with a reduced group of
representatives on each side. On the contrary, the
Caguán talks were a massive exercise with thousands
of guerrillas on one side and thousands of
government and civil society representatives on the
other in a large demilitarized zone, but porous in
relation to the national conflict.
In
Tlaxcala, México, in the early 1990’s, Gaviria
attempted to construct something outside of national
borders but, on that occasion, the meeting failed to
even establish an agenda.
The
failure of Caguán in 2002 was followed by the coming
to power of Álvaro Uribe, with an agenda which was
adverse to dialogue and focused on a military
solution to the war. However, one decade and
thousands of dead, billions of dollars later, the
elimination of the guerrilla movement was not
achieved, despite the fact that the most advanced
military techniques were deployed against its
members, from drones to satellite espionage.
The
two groups arrived in Havana without having been
able to win the war, given that the FARC-EP, as the
movement has acknowledged, is not in a position to
take power militarily.
That
is how, once again, the route of a negotiated peace
has been undertaken.
But
the issue is much more complex than talks between
two parties; making peace is very different from
constructing peace. The first is achieved between
contenders and the second is the task of an entire
nation.
The
guiding document for the current peace talks
constitutes a great advance in the sense of placing
the solution within the elements of the system which
gave rise to the conflict in the first place.
The
six agenda points cover historic problems within
Colombian society such as inequality of land tenure,
guarantees for political participation, illicit
cultivations of narcotic substances and the rights
of victims of the conflict.
No
less important are the necessary mechanisms for the
verification and endorsement of the end of the
conflict. Although this point has not been reached
nor is there an agreement as to how to do so, both
parties agree that it is the Colombian people who
must have the last word.
The
experiences of reaching any agreement between the
government and guerrilla movement without having
created the conditions in society as a whole have
been fatal. The elimination of thousands of member
of the Unión Patriótica – a party composed of
demobilized guerrillas formed in the 1980’s – is
fresh in the collective memory.
The
current balance of forces in Colombia is different,
but no less complex, even more so when the dialogue
is taking place without a cease-fire. Former
President Uribe is dedicating himself full time to
criticizing the peace process being promoted by the
President. Few doubt that Oscar Iván Zuluaga – the
Centro Democrático candidate for the 2014 elections,
who fully supports Uribe’s view—would end the peace
talks in Havana, if he should win.
At
the other extreme, a statement by the recently
appointed Army commander, Juan Pablo Rodríguez, to
the effect that the Colombian armed forces would
protect the FARC-EP should its members become
reincorporated into civilian life, is highly
positive.
In
any event, every session of the talks is constructed
on the basis of what each side is prepared to
concede, and this is one of the key questions in the
context of the current process.
Even
so, the Colombian government, FARC-EP and the
majority of analysts agree that in Havana, the peace
process has made reached further than ever before.
The two principles of an understanding, in relation
to the agrarian issue and political participation,
are unprecedented historical advances.
However, the greatest hope is, perhaps, the will to
reach a final agreement demonstrated by both
parties, to date in accordance with the desires of
all Colombians, who have been awaiting peace for
years.
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