The government
offensive in Syria and its implications
Moises Saab
EXPLODING bullets and the acrid
smell of tolite marking a turn around of armed
confrontations in Syria in favor of President Bashar
Al-Assad have had the effect of stirring up a hornet’s
nest in the Middle East and beyond.
Prior to the Syrian army’s taking of
the western city of Qusayr, where irregular forces
armed from abroad have a vital sanctuary, passions
were contained and movements toward peace, on the
basis of inequality on the ground, were advancing at
a reasonable pace.
This situation has changed in the
wake of a new reality in the theater of operations,
prompted by the entry into the conflict of the
Hezbollah (Arab Party of God) forces, the Lebanese
armed militia famed for its combativeness. The
taking of Qusayr set off alarm bells in various Arab
Gulf States, which mobilized their influence to
avert a disaster for the irregular forces and their
liquidation.
One clear echo in this context was
the suspension of diplomatic relations with Syria
decreed by Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi, in a
public act in support of the anti-government forces
operating in that country, made in public in a
covered stadium in Cairo.
A mordantly humorous description of
Morsi’s decree came in a phrase from a member of the
Egyptian opposition who said that, for the first
time in history, "someone had declared war in a
football stadium!"
The Egyptian President’s inopportune
decision was put down to reasons of internal
politics and convenience, given the situation of the
national economy, shored up by multi-million loans
and deposits from the oil bearing countries of the
Arabian Peninsula which are sponsoring the armed
groups in Syria.
Morsi’s gesture is significant
because after a visit to Russia in April, the
Egyptian leader moderated his position on the Syrian
conflict and stated his intention to contribute to a
negotiated solution of the crisis from a more
balanced perspective.
At the same time, the consequences
of the offensive in various areas of Syria prompted
increased criticism from the nations of the Arabian
Peninsula. The offensives are not new, but are now
opposed to their interests, implying the adoption of
urgent measures related to military supplies for the
irregulars, the materialization of which is
questionable.
In direct contrast to the
radicalization of the Arab monarchies is the
significant care with which Jordan carried out the
Eager Lion joint military maneuvers with the United
States, the start of which in early June caused
apprehension over the possible announcement of a
direct military invasion of Syria.
If that intention was on the cards,
it was neutralized by the crass errors of the armed
groups, in their majority of extreme Islamist
affiliation but, above all, by the firm position of
Russia, where authorities have reiterated that they
will not allow a repetition of what took place in
Libya in 2011 and, eight years previously, in Iraq.
Since the beginning of the Syrian
crisis, Moscow, accompanied by China, has
consistently opposed the efforts of the other three
permanent members of the UN Security Council, the
United States, France and the United Kingdom to
adopt resolutions which would give an advantage to
the opposition.
For Russia, the fall of Al Assad
implies a situation favorable to the interests of
the Western powers and their Arab allies which, in
the short term, would mean abandoning an area which
constitutes one of its flanks and hosts the
headquarters of the sole friendly Mediterranean port
for its navy.
In this context is inserted the
immutable position of Iran: its contribution to a
negotiated way out of the conflict on the basis of
non-interference in Syrian sovereignty and the
refusal to accept maximalist demands, in particular
that of President Al-Assad’s exit.
For Europe, with a closer geographic
proximity to the scene of conflict, the moment is
more complex, given that its backing of the Syrian
anti-government forces is in contradiction with its
allegations of combating terrorism, as argued by
France, a leading actor on the continent, in order
to dispatch military units to Mali.
The dynamics of this scenario had an
undeniable influence at the recent G-8 Summit,
members of which spoke out for the initiation of
peace talks on Syria as soon as possible, and where
Russia also left its mark.
"If we sign contracts for the sale
of weapons to Syria, we will fulfill them," declared
Russian President Vladimir Putin, a subtle statement,
but an unequivocal one that, this time, history will
not repeat itself. (PL)