WHAT could lead the most powerful
country in the world to invade a nation of only
110,000 inhabitants? Three decades ago, some 7,000
U.S. marines and parachutists occupied Grenada, in
an operation labeled Urgent Fury. The capital of
this Caribbean island was bombarded by aircraft,
helicopters and warships.
The United Nations condemned the
aggression. Ronald Reagan, who occupied the White
House at the time, responded, "100 nations in the
United Nations have not agreed with us on just about
everything that's come before them where we are
involved, and it didn't upset my breakfast at all."
This was the same President who when
asked about the possibility of invading Nicaragua in
1986 said, " You're looking at an individual that is
the last one in the world that would ever want to
put American troops into Latin America, because the
memory of the Great Colossus of the North is so
widespread in Latin America, we'd lose all our
friends if we did anything of that kind."
The events of October 1983 took
place within the framework of an effort by Reagan,
elected in 1981, to reestablish what in the view of
neoconservatives was "the needed recovery of the U.S.
military's ability to coerce," according to Cuban
political scientist and researcher Dr. Carlos
Alzugaray.
"In the perception of this group,
there existed what they described as a growing
danger, evidenced by revolutions in Iran, Nicaragua
and Grenada; Cuba's support to struggles in Angola
and Ethiopia; the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan;
and other international events," the expert told
Granma.
"They believed that all of this was
due to the weak image projected by the United States
after the defeat in Vietnam and the policy they
described as pacifist which President Carter had
implemented: a canal agreement with Panama,
tolerance of the Soviet-Cuban-Nicaraguan support for
revolutions in Central America, the Camp David
Accords between Israel and Palestine, a pacifist
policy in Europe, to give just a few examples."
Thus the current debate about the
relative loss of power on the part of the United
States - exacerbated by developments in Syria - has
a precedent in the 1970's. 1979, when Maurice Bishop
and his revolutionary New Jewel Movement came to
power, was also the year of the Islamic Revolution
in Iran and the Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua.
This was compounded by a decade of economic crisis.
The U.S. needed a show of force to
make clear that the country still had the resources,
and the will, to protect its strategic interests
wherever they might be challenged, Alzugaray said.
"The Caribbean Basin was, for many,
the perfect site, a location in which the
relationship of forces favored the U.S. given the
closeness and overwhelming military advantage.
"Both Nicaragua and Grenada were
considered vulnerable," Alzugaray continued, "but
different strategies were followed in the two
countries: a covert war against the first, with
support to reactionary regimes in the area, and an
open invasion of the latter, once propitious
conditions existed."
Grenada's revolutionary process fell
victim to internal contradictions. The new
government had disarmed the police, created a
Popular Assembly with representation and
participation by all social layers; began the
redistribution of land; supported access to health
care and education. More than 2,500 people had
learned to read and write by 1981. Nevertheless, one
segment of the leadership questioned Bishop's
politics and demanded more radical positions. This
led to his destitution, arrest and assassination on
October 19, 1983. These were the conditions under
which the U.S. mounted the invasion.
The most powerful country in the
world is today experiencing the erosion of its
hegemony. When faced with a similar situation in the
past, the U.S reacted by attacking a small country.
How might it respond today?
There were and are two possible
reactions, then and now, said Ernesto Domínguez,
from the University of Havana's Center for
Hemispheric and U.S. Studies (CEHSEU), speaking with
Granma: "Assume the decline and attempt to
manage it in such a way to preserve a privileged
position, or try to detain the process by resorting
to the use of force, with several concrete
objectives, such as giving a show of power,
reaffirming geo-strategic positions, controlling key
resources or stimulating the economy with military
spending."
However, Dr. Domínguez commented
that there are important differences between that
historical moment and the present. "In the first
place, at that time we were still in the middle of
the bi-polarism of the Cold War between the United
States and the Soviet Union. This added a factor
which does not currently exist, one of an identified
rival with which to compete, and a relationship of
understandable confrontation-equilibrium," the
professor asserted.
"At that time the decline was more
apparent than real, given that the rival in question
was in the process of internal disintegration which
was not evident until a few years later, but which
was already having serious effects, while the United
States was far from this. The movements in Latin
America and the Third World in general were strongly
connected to the USSR in many ways.
"Currently, the relative decline
appears more real, since multi-polarity is an
emerging process, albeit with still a long way to go.
Latin American movements do not depend on a
socialist camp or on a power counterpoised to the
United States. The current leftist and revolutionary
movements have their roots more openly and solidly
established in national and regional realities and
contradictions, and they themselves are attempting
to construct alternatives of integration," Alzugaray
said.