REFLECTIONS BY THE COMMANDER
IN CHIEF
WORLD TYRANNY
The Basics of the Killing Machine
The founding fathers of the American
nation could not imagine that what they were proclaiming at that
time, as any other historical society, was carrying within it
the seeds of its own transformation.
The attractive Declaration of Independence of
1776, which celebrated its 231st birthday last
Wednesday, stated something which in one way or another
captivated many of us: "We hold these truths to be self evident,
that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their
Creator with certain inalienable Rights, that among these are
Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these
rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their
just powers from the consent of the governed. That whenever any
Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the
Right of the People to alter it or abolish it, and to institute
new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and
organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most
likely to effect their Safety and Happiness."
It was the result of the influence of the
best minds and philosophers of a Europe overwhelmed by feudalism,
the privileges of the aristocracy and absolute monarchies.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau stated in his famous
Social Contract: "The strongest is never strong enough to be
always the master, unless he transforms strength into right, and
obedience into duty." (…) "Force is a physical power, and I fail
to see what moral effect it can have. To yield to force is an
act of necessity, not of will…" (…) "To renounce liberty is to
renounce being a man, to surrender the rights of Humanity and
even its duties. For him who renounces everything no indemnity
is possible."
In the Thirteen Colonies that obtained their
independence, there were also forms of slavery as atrocious as
those in ancient times. Men and women were sold at public
auction. The new nation emerged with its own religion and
culture. The Tea Tax was the spark that set off the rebellion.
In those vast lands slavery continued for at
least 100 years, and after two centuries, slave descendants are
still feeling the consequences. There were native communities
which were the legitimate natural inhabitants, as well as
forests, water, lakes, herds of millions of bison, natural
species of animals and plants, abundant and various foods.
Hydrocarbons were unknown then, as was the enormous wasting of
energy carried out by today’s society.
Had the same declaration of principles been
proclaimed in the countries crossed by the Sahara Desert, it
would not have created a paradise for European immigrants. Today
we must speak about immigrants coming from the poor countries
that cross, or try to cross, the U.S. borders by the millions
each year in the quest for jobs, and are not entitled even to
parental custody over their children if they are born on U.S.
soil.
The Philadelphia Declaration was written at a
time when there were only small printing presses and letters
took years to get from one country to another. There were only a
few people who could read and write. Today, images, words and
ideas travel in a fraction of a second from one corner to
another in a globalized planet. Conditioned reflexes are created
in the minds of people. We cannot speak about the right to use,
but rather about the overuse of free expression and mass
alienation. Likewise, with modest electronic equipment, anybody,
during peacetime, can send their ideas out into the world
without any authorization from any Constitution. It would be a
battle of ideas; in any case, a mass of truths versus a mass of
lies.
Truths do not need commercial advertisements.
Nobody could disagree with the Philadelphia Declaration or with
Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Social Contract. Both documents support
the right to struggle against the established world tyranny.
Could we ignore the pillaging wars and the
slaughters which are forced upon the poor peoples who make up
three-quarters of the planet? No! Those are typical of today’s
world and of a system that could not sustain itself otherwise.
At an enormous political, economic and scientific cost, the
human species is being pushed to the edge of an abyss.
My aim is not to repeat concepts that I have
mentioned in other reflections. Based on simple events, my
purpose is to carry on demonstrating the immense hypocrisy and
the total lack of ethics which characterize the actions, chaotic
by nature, of the government of the United States.
In "The Killing Machine", published last
Sunday, I said that it was through one of the declassified CIA
documents that we found out about the attempt to poison me using
an official of the Cuban government with access to my office. It
dealt with a person about whom I should have sought out some
information, since I didn't have the elements on hand to make
the necessary judgement. In fact, I offered my apologies if I
was hurting the feelings of any descendants, whether or not the
concerned person were guilty. I later continued to analyze other
important subjects in the CIA revelations.
During the early days of the Revolution, I
used to visit, almost on a daily basis, the recently created
National Institute of Agrarian Reform, located where today we
have the headquarters of the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed
Forces. We were not able to use the Palace of the Revolution yet,
since that was the venue of the Palace of Justice at that time.
Its construction resulted from juicy business deals made by the
overthrown regime. The main profit came from the increased value
of real estate lands, from which thousands of people had been
evicted. As a recently graduated lawyer, I worked pro bono
as the attorney for the defense of those people, months
before Batista’s coup d'état.
From the offices of INRA, on March 4, 1960, I
heard an ear-splitting explosion of La Coubre and I
watched a dark column of smoke rising above the port of Havana.
What came to my mind immediately was the thought of a ship
loaded with anti-tank and anti-personal grenades that could be
used in the FAL rifles we had acquired from Belgium, a country
far from being suspected of being Communist. Right away I went
down to go to that location. On my way there, because of the
noise and the vehicle’s vibrations, I could not hear the second
explosion. More than 100 people died and dozens were maimed. At
the funeral for the victims, the cry of "Homeland or Death"
(Patria o Muerte) was spontaneously born.
We know that everything was carefully planned
by the Central Intelligence Agency right from the port where the
ship was loaded. The ship had passed through the ports of Le
Havre, Hamburg and Antwerp. The grenades were loaded at the last
of these, in Belgium. The explosions on the ship also killed
several of the French crew.
Why, in the name of freedom of information,
do they not declassify a single document that will tell us how
the CIA, almost half a century ago, exploded the steamship La
Coubre and cut off the supply of Belgian weapons which, as
the CIA itself admitted on June 14, 1960, was a very important
concern for the United States?
What was I devoting my time to during the
feverish days previous to the attack through Bay of Pigs?
The first large-scale clean-up in the
Escambray Mountains took place during the last months of 1960 up
until early in 1961. More than 50 thousand men took part, almost
all of them coming from the former provinces of Havana and Las
Villas.
A flood of weapons was arriving in ships from
the USSR. These were not exploding in ports. It was useless to
try to buy them elsewhere, and thus we avoided the pretext that
the United States used to attack Guatemala, which eventually
cost more than one hundred thousand Guatemalan people dead or
missing.
In Czechoslovakia we bought light weapons and
a number of 20 mm and double-barrelled anti-aircraft guns. The
tanks with 85 mm cannons, 100 mm armored artillery, 75 mm
antitank cannon, mortars, howitzers and large caliber cannon up
to 122 mm, and light and heavy anti-aircraft, all came directly
from the USSR.
It would have taken at least a year to train
by traditional methods the personnel needed to use all that
weaponry. We did it in a matter of weeks. We dedicated
practically one hundred percent of our time to that task almost
two years after the triumph of the Revolution.
We were aware of an imminent attack, but didn’t
know when or how it would come. All possible access points were
being defended or guarded. The leaders all had their
headquarters: Raúl in Oriente, Almeida in the center, and Che in
Pinar del Río. I was headquartered in the capital: a former
bourgeois residence had been adapted for that purpose on the
highest right bank of the Almendares River, close to the point
where the river flows into the sea.
It was already daylight on April 15, 1961,
and there I was, since the first early morning hours, receiving
news from Oriente, when a ship had come from the southern United
States, skippered by Nino Díaz, with a group of
counterrevolutionaries on board dressed in olive green fatigues
similar to the ones worn by our troops, ready to land in the
Baracoa area. This was to create a diversion far from the exact
site of the main attack, in order to create maximum confusion.
The ship was already at the crosshairs of the antitank cannons,
but in the end the landing did not take place.
On the night of the 14th, we also
got news that one of our three jet fighters, which were training
craft ready for engagement, had blown up during a reconnaissance
flight over the area of presumptive landing. This was
undoubtedly a Yankee action perpetrated from the Guantánamo
Naval Base or somewhere else in the sea or the air. There was no
radar to exactly pinpoint the event. The outstanding
revolutionary pilot, Orestes Acosta, died in that action.
From the headquarters I mentioned, I could
see the B-26s flying low over the spot and, a few seconds later,
I heard the first missiles launched without warning against our
young artillery, who for the most part were being trained at the
Ciudad Libertad Air Base. The response of those brave men was
practically instantaneous.
Besides, I have no doubt whatsoever that Juan
Orta was a traitor. The pertinent details about his life and
conduct are where they ought to be: in the archives of the
Department of State Security, born in those years under enemy
fire. The most politically conscious men were the ones assigned
that mission.
Orta had received the poisoned pills which
had been proposed to Maheu by Giancana. Maheu’s conversation
with Roselli, who would play the part of mob contact, took place
on September 14, 1960, months before Kennedy’s election and
inauguration.
The traitor, Orta, had no special merits. We
kept writing each other when we were looking for the support of
Cuban emigrants and exiles in the United States. He was
appreciated for his apparent training and helpful attitude. That
was where his special talent laid. After the triumph of the
Revolution, he had frequent access to me during an important
period. Based on his possibilities then, it was believed that he
would be able to put the poison into a soft drink or a glass of
orange juice.
He had received money from the mob supposedly
for helping to reopen the gambling casinos. He had nothing to do
with this. We were the ones who had made that decision.
Urrutia's unilateral order, issued without previous consultation,
was creating chaos and promoting protests by thousands of
workers in the tourist and business sectors, at a time when
unemployment was running high.
Some time later, the gambling casinos were
shut down for good by the Revolution.
When he was given the poison, contrary to
what used to happen in the early days, Orta had very little
possibilities to coincide with me. I was fully involved in the
activities I previously described.
Without saying a word to anybody about the
enemy plans, on April 13th, 1961, two days before the attack on
our air bases, Orta sought asylum at the Venezuelan Embassy
which Rómulo Betancourt had placed at the unconditional service
of Washington. The numerous counterrevolutionaries seeking
asylum there were not granted exit permits until the brutal
armed aggression by the United States against Cuba let up.
We already had to put up with the betrayal of
Rafael del Pino Siero in Mexico. After deserting a few days
before our departure for Cuba, a date he wasn’t aware of, he
sold to Batista for 30 thousand dollars some important secrets
dealing with part of the weapons and the boat which would take
us to Cuba. With elegant cunning he divided up the information
in order to gain confidence and to guarantee compliance with
each part. First, he would receive some thousands of dollars for
delivering two weapons deposits that he knew about. A week later,
he would deliver the most important information: the boat that
was bringing us to Cuba and the landing site. They would be able
to capture us all along with the other weapons, but before that,
they had to give him all of the money. Some Yankee expert surely
had advised him.
Despite this betrayal, we left Mexico in the
"Granma" on the set date. Some of our supporters thought that
Pino would never betray us, that his desertion was due to his
dislike of discipline and the training I demanded of him. I
won’t say how I learned of the operation that had been hatched
between him and Batista, but I learned about it with full
precision, so we were able to take appropriate measures in order
to protect personnel and weapons that were en route to Tuxpan,
the launch site. That valuable information didn’t cost a penny.
When the final offensive by the tyranny in
the Sierra Maestra had finished, we had to also fight against
the bold tricks of Evaristo Venereo, an agent of the regime who,
disguised as a revolutionary, tried to infiltrate the Movement
in Mexico. He was the liaison with the secret police in that
country, a very repressive body which he advised for the
interrogation of Cándido González; this heroic militant was
blindfolded during his interrogation and was assassinated after
the landing. He was one of the few comrades who drove the car I
moved around in.
Evaristo returned to Cuba later. He was
assigned the mission of assassinating me when our forces were
advancing towards Santiago de Cuba, Holguín, Las Villas and the
western part of Cuba. We learned of the details when we took
over the archives of the Military Intelligence Service. These
events are documented.
I have survived numerous assassination plots.
Only luck and the habit of carefully observing every detail
allowed all of us, Camilo, Che, Raúl, Almeida, Guillermo, who
were later known as the leaders of a triumphant Revolution, to
survive the trickery of Eutimio Guerra during the early and most
dramatic days in the Sierra Maestra. We might have possibly died
when we were at the verge of being eliminated with a ridiculous
siege laid on our camp by surprise under the traitor’s guidance.
During the brief clash that ensued, we suffered a sad loss: a
wonderful, black sugar worker and active combatant, Julio Zenón
Acosta, who moved ahead of me and fell at my side. Others
survived the deadly danger, and fell in combat afterwards, as
was the case of Ciro Frías, an excellent comrade and promising
leader, who died in Imías, in the Second Front; Ciro Redondo,
who fiercely fought the enemy with the troops of Che’s column,
and was killed in Marverde; and Julito Díaz, who was
relentlessly shooting his caliber 30 machine gun and died a few
steps from our Command Post at El Uvero battle.
We set up the ambush at a very well chosen
spot, waiting for the enemy, because we were aware of the moves
they intended to make that day. Our attention slackened for a
few minutes when two men from the group, who had been sent out
as scouts before deciding to move, returned without news.
Eutimio was guiding the enemy dressed in a
white ‘guayabera’ shirt, the only thing visible in the Alto de
Espinosa woods, where we were waiting for him. Batista had the
headlines ready about the elimination of the whole group, which
was for him a sure thing, and had notified the press. Out of
excessive confidence, we had in fact underestimated the enemy
which was taking advantage of human weaknesses. At that time, we
were a group of about 22 well-seasoned and selected men. Ramiro,
wounded in one leg, was recovering at some distance from us.
The column of more than 300 soldiers, who
were advancing one abreast through the sheer and wooded
landscape, was spared a storming blow, thanks to a last-minute
move that we made.
How did that machine work in the face of the
Cuban Revolution?
As early as April of 1959, I visited the
United States as a guest of the Washington Press Club. Nixon
deigned to have me visit him in his private office. Later he
said that I was inexperienced in the subject of economics.
I was so aware of this inexperience, that I
enrolled in three university degree courses in order to qualify
for a scholarship that would allow me to study Economics at
Harvard. I had already finished and had written the exams for
all the Law, Diplomatic Law and Social Science courses. I only
had two subjects to be examined on: History of Social Doctrines
and History of Political Doctrines. I had been studying them
carefully. That year, no other student was making the effort.
The path had been cleared, but events were on the fast track in
Cuba and I understood that this was not the time to take a
scholarship to go study Economics.
I went to Harvard on a visit at the end of
1948. As I returned to New York, I bought a copy of The
Capital in English in order to study Marx’s most notable
work and at the same time improve my command of that language. I
was not "an underground Communist Party member" as Nixon, with
his crafty and penetrating gaze, happened to think. If there is
something I can be sure of, and I discovered it at the
University, is that I was first a Utopian Communist and then a
radical Socialist by virtue of my own analysis and studies, and
was ready to fight with the proper strategies and tactics.
My only qualm about speaking with Nixon was
the distaste I had in frankly explaining my philosophy to a Vice-president
and a likely future President of the United States, an expert in
imperialist economic concepts and governing methods, which I had
ceased to believe in long ago.
What was the gist of that meeting which took
hours, according to the author of the declassified memo that
refers to it? I only have my own memories of what happened. I
have selected the paragraphs from this memo which, in my opinion,
best explain Nixon’s ideas.
"He (Castro) was particularly concerned about
whether he might have irritated Senator Smathers for the
comments he made with regard to him. I reassured him at the
beginning of the conversation that 'Meet the Press’ was one of
the most difficult programs a public official could go to and
that he had done extremely well – particularly having in mind
the fact that he had the courage to go on in English rather than
to speak through a translator."
"It was also apparent that as far as his
visit to the United States was concerned that his primary
interest was ‘not to get a change in the sugar quota or to get a
government loan but to win support for his policies from
American public opinion."
"It was this almost slavish subservience to
prevailing majority opinion –the voice of the mob– rather than
his naïve attitude towards Communism and his obvious lack of
understanding of even the most elementary economic principles
which concerned me most in evaluating what kind of a leader he
might eventually turn out to be. That is the reason why I spent
as much time as I could trying to emphasize that he had the
great gift of leadership, but that it was the responsibility of
a leader not always to follow public opinion (but to help to
direct it in the proper channels,) not to give the people what
they think they want at a time of emotional stress but to make
them want what they ought to have."
"I in my turn, tried to impress upon him the
fact that while we believe in majority rule that even a majority
can be tyrannous and that there are certain individual rights
which a majority should never have the power to destroy."
"I frankly doubt that I made too much of an
impression upon him but he did listen and appeared to be
somewhat receptive. I tried to cast my appeal to him primarily
in terms of how his place in history would be affected by the
courage and statesmanship he displayed at this time. I
emphasized that the easy thing to do was to follow the mob, but
that the right thing in the long run would be better for the
people and, of course, better for him as well. As I have already
indicated he was incredibly naïve with regard to the Communist
threat and appeared to have no fear whatever that the Communists
might eventually come to power in Cuba."
"In our discussions of Communism I again
tried to cast the arguments in terms of his own self-interest
and to point out that the revolution which he had led might be
turned against him and the Cuban people unless he kept control
of the situation and made sure that the Communists did not get
into positions of power and influence. On this score I feel I
made very little impression, if any."
"I put as much emphasis as possible on the
need for him to delegate responsibility, but again whether I got
across was doubtful."
"It was apparent that while he paid lip
service to such institutions as freedom of speech, press and
religion that his primary concern was with developing programs
for economic progress. He said over and over that a man who
worked in the sugar cane fields for three months a year and
starved the rest of the year wanted a job, something to eat, a
house and some clothing."
"He indicated that it was very foolish for
the United States to furnish arms to Cuba or any other Caribbean
country. He said ‘anybody knows that our countries are not going
to be able to play any part in the defense of this hemisphere in
the event a world war breaks out. The arms governments get in
this hemisphere are only used to suppress people as Batista used
his arms to fight the revolution. It would be far better if the
money that you give to Latin American countries for arms be
provided for capital investment.’ I will have to admit that as
far as his basic argument was concerned here I found little that
I could disagree with!"
"We had a rather extended discussion of how
Cuba could get this investment capital it needed for economic
progress. He insisted that what Cuba primarily needed and what
he wanted was not private capital but government capital."
I was referring to the capital owned by the
Cuban government.
Nixon himself acknowledged that I never asked
for any resources from the U.S. government. He got a little
mixed up and said:
"… that government capital was limited
because of the many demands upon it and the budget problems we
presently confronted."
It was evident I clarified him on that
because right afterwards he pointed out in his memo:
"… that there was competition for capital
throughout the Americas and the world and that it would not go
to a country where there was any considerable fear that policies
might be adopted which would discriminate against private
enterprise."
"Here again on this point I doubt if I made
too much of an impression."
"I tried tactfully to suggest to Castro that
Muñoz Marín had done a remarkable job in Puerto Rico in
attracting private capital and in generally raising the standard
of living of his people and that Castro might well send one of
his top economic advisors to Puerto Rico to have a conference
with Muñoz Marín. He took a very dim view of this suggestion,
pointing out that the Cuban people were ‘very nationalistic’ and
would look with suspicion on any programs initiated in what they
would consider to be a ‘colony’ of the United States."
"I am inclined to think that the real reason
for his attitude is simply that he disagreed with Muñoz firm
position as an advocate of private enterprise and does not want
to get any advice which might divert him from his course of
leading Cuba toward more socialism of its economy."
"You in America should not be talking so much
about your fear of what the Communists may do in Cuba or in some
other country in Latin America, Asia or Africa…"
"I also tried to put our attitude toward
communism in context by pointing out that Communism was
something more than just an idea but that its agents were
dangerously effective in their ability to grasp power and to set
up dictatorships."
"Significantly enough he did not raise any
questions about the sugar quota nor did he engage in any
specific discussions with regard to economic assistance."
"My own appraisal of him as a man is somewhat
mixed. The one fact we can be sure of is that he has those
indefinable qualities which make him a leader of men. Whatever
we may think of him he is going to be a great factor in the
development of Cuba and very possibly in Latin American affairs
generally. He seems to be sincere, he is either incredibly naïve
about Communism or under Communist discipline…"
"But because he has the power to lead to
which I have referred we have no choice but at least to try to
orient him in the right direction."
That was the end of his confidential memo to
the White House.
When Nixon started to talk, nothing could
stop him. He was used to preaching Latin American presidents. He
did not prepare any drafts of what he intended to say or took
notes of what he actually said. He responded to questions that
were never asked. He dealt with subjects based only on the
opinions he had about his interlocutor. Not even an elementary
school student would hope to receive so many lessons altogether
on democracy, anti-Communism and other matters related to the
art of governing. He was fond of developed capitalism and its
domain of the world out of its own natural right. He idealized
the system. He didn’t conceive otherwise, nor was there the
slightest possibility of getting through to him.
The killings began under the Eisenhower and
Nixon governments. There is no other way to explain why
Kissinger exclaimed, and I quote, that "blood would flow if we
knew, for example, that Robert Kennedy, the Attorney General,
had personally directed the assassination of Fidel Castro". Some
blood had flown before. What the former administrations did,
with few exceptions, was to follow the same policy.
In a memorandum dated on December 11, 1959,
the head of the CIA’s Western Hemisphere Division, J.C. King,
said, and I quote: "We must give thorough consideration to the
elimination of Fidel Castro. […] Many informed people believe
that the disappearance of Fidel would greatly accelerate the
fall of the government…"
As it was recognized by the CIA and the
Church Senate Committee in 1975, the assassination plans sprang
up in 1960, when the purpose of destroying the Cuban Revolution
was included in the president’s agenda dated March that year.
The J.C. King memo was sent to Allen Dulles, the CIA Director,
with a note that expressly requested approval for those and
other measures. They were all accepted and gladly welcomed,
specially the proposal of assassination, as reflected by the
following annotation in the document signed by Allen Dulles and
dated one day after, on December 12: "The recommendation
contained in Paragraph 3 is approved."
In a draft of a book that would contain a
detailed analysis of declassified documents, written by Pedro
Álvarez-Tabío, Director of the Historical Affairs Office of the
Council of State, it is stated that: "Up to 1993, the Cuban
State Security had discovered and neutralized a total of 627
conspiracies against the life of the Commander in Chief Fidel
Castro. This figure includes both the plans that reached some
phase of concrete execution and those which were neutralized at
an early stage, as well as other attempts that by various ways
and for different reasons have been publicly revealed in the
United States itself. It does not include a number of cases that
could not be verified, since the only available information was
the testimony of some of the participants. This of course did
not include any of the plans plotted after 1993."
Previously, we were able to learn from the
report by Colonel Jack Hawkins, CIA paramilitary chief during
the preparations for the Bay of Pigs invasion, that "the
paramilitary General Staff studied the possibility of organizing
an assault force of greater magnitude than the small contingency
force planned earlier."
"It was thought that this force would be
landed in Cuba after effective resistance activity, including
active guerrilla forces had been developed. It should be noted
that guerrilla forces were operating successfully in the
Escambray mountains during this period. It was visualized that
the landing of the assault force, after widespread resistance
activity had been created, would precipitate general uprisings
and widespread defection among Castro's armed forces which could
contribute materially to his overthrow."
"The concept for employment of the force in
the amphibious/airlift assault was discussed at meetings of the
Special Group during November and December 1960. The group took
no definite position on ultimate employment of such a force but
did not oppose its continued development for possible employment.
President Eisenhower was briefed on the concept in late November
of that year by CIA representatives. He indicated that he
desired vigorous continuation of all activities then in progress
by all Departments concerned."
What did Hawkins report about the results of
the covert operations program against Cuba from September 1960
to April 1961?
Nothing less than the following:
"a. Introduction of Paramilitary Agents.
Seventy trained paramilitary agents,
including nineteen radio operators, were introduced into the
target country. Seventeen radio operators succeeded in
establishing communication circuits with CIA headquarters,
although a number were later captured or lost their equipment."
"b. Air Supply Operations.
These operations were not successful. Of 27
missions attempted, only four achieved desired results. The
Cuban pilots demonstrated early that they didn't have the
required capabilities for this kind of operation. A request for
authority to use American contract pilots for these missions was
denied by the Special Group, although authority to hire pilots
for possible eventual use was granted."
"c. Sea Supply Operations.
These operations achieved considerable
success. Boats plying between Miami and Cuba delivered over 40
tons of military arms, explosives and equipment, and infiltrated/exfiltrated
a large number of personnel. Some of the arms delivered were
used for partially equipping a 400 man guerrilla force which
operated for a considerable time in the Escambray, Las Villas
Province. Most of the acts of sabotage carried out in Havana and
other sites used materials provided in this fashion."
"d. Development of Guerrilla Activity.
Agents introduced into Cuba succeeded in
developing a widespread underground organization extending from
Havana into all of the provinces. However, there was no truly
effective guerrilla activity anywhere in Cuba except in the
Escambray Mountains, where an estimated 600 to one thousand ill-equipped
guerrilla troops, organized in bands of 50 to 200 men, operated
successfully for over six months […]. A CIA trained coordinator
for action in the Escambray entered Cuba clandestinely and
succeeded in reaching the guerrilla area, but he was promptly
captured and executed. Other small guerrilla units operated at
times in the provinces of Pinar del Río and Oriente, but they
achieved no significant results. Agents reported large numbers
of unarmed men in all provinces who were wiling to participate
in guerrilla activity if armed."
"e. Sabotage.
1) From October 1960 through April 15 1961
sabotage activity included the following:
"(a) Approximately 300 thousand tons of sugar
cane destroyed in 800 separate fires."
"(b) Approximately other 150 fires were set
in 42 tobacco warehouses, two paper plants, a sugar refinery,
two dairies, four stores, 21 Communist homes."
"(c) Approximately 110 bombings, including
Communist Party offices, Havana power station, two stores,
railroad terminal, bus terminal, militia barracks, railroad
train."
"(d) Approximately 200 nuisance bombs in
Havana Province."
"(e) Derailment of 6 trains, destruction of a
microwave cable and station, and destruction of numerous power
transformers."
"(f) A commando-type raid launched from the
sea against Santiago, which put the refinery out of work for
about one week."
So much for what we have known thanks to the
Hawkins’ report. Anyone could understand that 200 bombs planted
in the main province of an underdeveloped country which lived on
the single crop farming of sugar cane, which is a semi-slave
form of production, and on the sugar quota that had been earned
for almost two centuries for being a guaranteed supplier, and
whose major productive lands and sugar refineries belonged to
large United States companies, constituted a brutal act of
tyranny against the Cuban people. Add to this all the other
actions that were carried out.
I will say no more. It is enough for today.
Fidel Castro Ruz
July 7, 2007
Time: 3:00pm