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THE
45th ANIVERSARY OF THE REVOLUTIONARY DIRECTORATE
EXPEDITION
The strategic
option of the Escambray guerrilla front
BY
GUILLERMO JIMÉNEZ —Special for Granma
International—
BY the
end of April 1957 the Revolutionary Directorate (DR)
had been virtually decimated in its leadership
structure, its underground organization had been
blown and the few survivors who were keeping things
going were isolated, surrounded and without
resources.
An
effort as exceptional as the assault on the
Presidential Palace had absorbed valuable combat
resources, compromised the organizational
infrastructure and above all, had taken the lives of
a select group of experienced combatants, in
particular the DR’s principal leader José Antonio
Echeverría, a 24-year-old whose strong personality
and political flair had taken him beyond the
University stairway and the country’s borders. As
if that wasn’t enough, a month later on April 20,
when it was in the process of regrouping and
overcoming its losses to resume combat, Fructuoso
Rodríguez, who had succeeded Echeverría as both DR
general secretary and president of the Federation of
University Students (FEU), was killed at 7, Humboldt
Street together with Juan Pedro Carbó Servía,
José Machado and Joe Westbrook, all members of the
national executive. It was a terrible blow to a
gallant resolve sustained only by pride.
After
those dramatic events, Faure Chomón, who replaced
Fructuoso as general secretary, and the great
majority of the survivors of the March 13 actions,
took different routes into exile with the idea of
recouping and renewing resources, analyzing and
returning in greater force, while Julio García and
Enrique Rodríguez-Loeches remained in Cuba as
members of the executive. Shortly afterwards, the
former had to go and the latter followed him after
handing me the contacts, meager resources, means of
communicating with Faure and other information
related to the organization in Cuba. I was
designated the Cuban delegate of the national
executive and constituted a provisional executive
with Orlando Blanco, Gutiérrez Menoyo, Cheo Silva,
Zayda Trimiño and subsequently Osmel Francis and
Natalia Bolívar.
After
overcoming innumerable obstacles, during that period
Fidel and a small group of expeditionaries from the Granma
landing had not only managed to survive but had
inserted themselves in the Sierra Maestra, making it
so impregnable that by May they had moved up to a
higher stage of guerrilla warfare, demonstrated by
the battle of Uvero. For some of us in Cuba the
greater potential for success and survival using
that unique strategy then flourishing in the Sierra
Maestra was becoming tangible. And amen to its reach
as a constant focus of agitation, consistent
struggle and political development, essential
factors for a victory that could not be won in the
short term.
The
possibility of opening a second guerrilla front in
the mountainous area of the Escambray, with the aim
of dividing and distracting the government forces,
became apparent to me for the first time during a
stopover in Santa Clara when I was part of a mission
to reorganize the DR to include the three
easternmost provinces, following instructions from
Fructuoso and Faure in a meeting two or three days
before the former was killed.
On
that occasion, when I made contact with the 26th of
July Movement in that province they informed me of
an imminent plan for a combined assault on military
premises which, if it failed to met its objectives
anticipated a retreat into those Escambray
mountains.
Influenced
by these ideas in parallel with the labor of
reorganizing and extending the damaged underground
structure, I began to organize the budgets to open a
guerrilla front in that region involving the
insurrectional organizations of the 26th of July
Movement and the Authentic Organization (OA). We
worked specifically with Santiago Riera, formerly
26th of July coordinator in La Villas province, and
Dario Pedrosa; and with Plinio Prieto, an AO member,
although a little later moved ahead with the project
on our own.
In
June or July 1957 we went to Miami to meet with
Faure, with two basic proposals. One was to transmit
and discuss a message sent by Fidel through Haydée
Santamaría, with whom we had met up with in Havana,
inviting the DR national executive to the Sierra
Maestra or to send a delegate and an emissary. The
other was to gain approval for our guerrilla
initiative, which they were still unaware of, and
was a change in the recommended strategy framing the
underground struggle with one decisive and combative
front to operate in the capital, inscribed within
the slogan "Strike upwards."
After
two or three days of thorny discussions with Faure
and the other members of the national executive in
Miami: Eduardo García Lavandero, Alberto Mora and
Armando Pérez, it was decided to opt for the
eclectic line of continuing the former underground
strategy but without suppressing guerrilla
preparations, as long as the latter didn’t take
resources destined to the former.
On our
return to Cuba we persisted in building the
movement. With the entry of many and anonymous
revolutionaries from different sectors and
localities, the DR quickly expanded its agitation
work and propaganda, fundraising, proselytizing,
coordination with the provincial delegations and the
organization and sustaining of the August 5 strike
after the death of Frank País. We likewise planned
and undertook acts of sabotage and attack, without
discounting other forms of struggle such as a
general strike and training an army. In parallel, we
intensified guerrilla training, acquired essential
information on geographical data, access routes and
other characteristics of the zone selected. Together
with inhabitants of the neighboring areas we
developed a rearguard force in Las Villas that was
essential for the existence and subsequent
development of the Front.
Gradually,
a group of comrades from Havana became involved in
this work, including Eloy, Primitivo Lima, Orlando
Pérez, Armando Fleites — former president of the
School of Medicine and a native of Las Villas —
Roger González, Justina Arrúe, Angel Quevedo from
Cienfuegos, and July Fernández Cossío. Marta
Jiménez, whose job as a perfume saleswoman allowed
her freedom of movement, traveled to the province on
various backup tasks. Meanwhile, Ramón Pando,
president of the FEU at the University of Las
Villas, gave decisive support as coordinator by
instigating the necessary infrastructure in this
province with its basic network in the city of
Sanctí Spíritus through Enrique Villegas, together
with valiant and altruistic comrades like Piro
Abreu, the Suárez fanmily, the Brizuela sisters,
Julio Castillo, Valdés Muñoz, Fariñas and others.
Subsequently, with the arrival of the
expeditionaries, Humberto Castelló, Tony Santiago
and others went up into the mountains.
The
events of September 5, 1957 plus other setbacks in
the capital left the revolutionary forces
disheartened and we needed to regain the initiative.
We came to an agreement with the 26th of July
Movement in Havana to unleash a series of actions in
the capital, while going ahead with the guerrilla
initiative. This meant having to locate men and
weapons in the area and we gave that responsibility
to Eloy Gutiérrez Menoyo, chief of action, with
Luis Goicochea and others. Starting September 26
they began to transfer from Havana an arsenal
collected over the months, which including seven old
rifles and some M3’s left over from March 13, 19
Italian carbines sent from Miami and initially
stockpiled by Cheo Silva, some Mauser repeat pistols
donated by Manolito Carbonell and taken in error.
There were also some long-range weapons originally
belonging to the OA and obtained by Elisa Ferrer de
Blanck, sister and cousin of the Corinthya
martyrs of the same surname. I arrived in November
1957, after Faure had called together all the
national executive comrades in Miami and Julio
García had returned from Costa Rica (in September).
At the end of November Rodríguez-Loaches came in
from Spain. Faure, Alberto Mora, Rolando Cubelas,
García Lavandero and Armando Pérez were located in
Miami. In December, Faure and Eduardo, with the
decisive cooperation of Armando Garrido, a fellow
student of the former, undertook the organization of
the expedition and defined the route and means for
returning to Cuba.
However,
during our absence from Cuba, Eloy was assigning
responsibilities within the incipient guerrilla
movement with certain individuals of dubious moral
and revolutionary fiber. On the other hand, a
definitive blow was being planned with a general
strike to be launched by the 26th of July Movement
in the Plains on April 9, 1957. Both situations gave
rise to long-held doubts as to the validity of the
guerrilla effort and complex debates went on in the
executive as to the final destiny of weapons and men
to transport for the expedition in continuous
nocturnal sessions for various weeks before the
Miami embarkation for Cuba. Finally, we decided to
divide the two "Solomon-style" according
to characteristics and needs of the guerrilla front
and the clandestine struggle in the capital in
support of the upcoming strike.
The Escapade
expedition left Miami on January 31, 1958 and
after using three vessels for two crossings — the
latter in the middle of Nuevitas Bay — in an
eventful journey on storm-tossed seas, losing
course, threats of being discovered and scarcity of
food and liquid, 15 men (some of them sick prior to
or during the crossing), landed with a cache of arms
on Santa Rita beach in Nuevitas, on February 8 at
22:00, two hours later than scheduled. Under cover
of a very cloudy night, a desolating cold that broke
records dating back decades according to
meteorologists, and a wintry spell that had driven
the curious from the beach (but not an indiscreet
pack of dogs that howled and barked continuously),
we rapidly unloaded the arms in a human chain,
concealing them in a nearby house.
A
group made up of Castell, Argüelles, Fleites,
Figueredo, Julio — dangerously ill with pneumonia
— Blanco and myself remained there all night
guarding the cache until the next day, when they
were concealed in traditional milk containers and
transported by a distribution truck that did the
Nuevitas to Camagüey run. With few incidents we
passed by three garrisons of the Rural Guard, whose
men, stationed along the rectilinear highway with
long-range weapons, were registering vehicles on
that bright Cuban morning.
The
last three of us continued with the truck and
weapons to a recreational park alongside the Rural
Guard garrison where Alberto and ourselves, on our
second vigil, carefully lifted out the weapons one
by one. The slightest brush against the metal
amplified an interminable echo that jarred the
night.
Castell,
Raulito Díaz-Argüelles, Figueredo, Pepé
Fernández Cossío and myself left for Havana on
February 10, 1958 to prepare the cadres for the
approaching strike. Armando Pérez and others who
had arrived by different means with the previously
alerted OA, took the weapons designated for the
capital. Three days later, Faure went up into the
Escambray driving 59 long-range weapons at the head
of a group made up of the Miami expeditionaries
(García Lavandero, Rodríguez-Loeches, Alberto
Blanco, Luis Blanca, Rolando Cubelas and Alberto
Mora, the last two supposedly to remain there), with
combatants from Camagüey and Sanctí Spíritus, to
sort out the confused situation with Eloy and return
to Havana to coordinate participation in the general
strike. On February 19 the expeditionaries were
involved in direct combat in La Diana and Pando was
wounded, taken prisoner and never seen again after
descending with Clodmira Acosta, who had been sent
by Fidel to contact the Escambray rebels. Shortly
before, on January 25, 1958, Villegas had died in
those mountains.
After
that, with the gradual addition of old and new
revolutionary combatants, the definitive presence
from July of Chomón and the separation from the DR
ranks of Eloy and Fleites, the guerrilla front
achieved a greater impetus to become a strategic
option that, in combined forces with the column
commanded by the legendary Che Guevara, contributed
in a decisive way to the final battle for victory.
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