Controversial
economic recovery in the United States
Osvaldo
Martínez, director of the Center for Research into
the World Economy
ONE year has gone by since the current economic
crisis began its cycle of destruction; however, its
duration could already have extended to two years,
given that it was in the summer of 2007 that signs
of the real estate crisis, the prelude to this
global crisis, became apparent in the United States.
A controversy is underway in the rich countries
hit by the crisis over the much-desired recovery, in
relation to certain quarterly indicators that have
displayed a slight upturn or whose rate of descent
has slowed. Some economists are affirming that the
crisis is over and joyfully announcing an imminent
and energetic recovery.
However, the most objective analyses indicate
that these are desires converted into predictions
with a scientific appearance and that this global
crisis – the most profound since the 1930s – cannot
be declared a thing of the past, as it still retains
the potential to produce greater destruction and to
take many by surprise on account of its
unprecedented characteristics.
This crisis cannot be seen as a repetition of
that of 1929, as this one is an unique organism
containing a mix of various crises (food, energy,
ecological, social and financial) in the midst of a
high rate of globalization with toxic assets (those
lacking real backing) disseminated throughout the
world economy, combined with incredibly complex
finances (investment banks, tax havens, high-risk
funds, insurance companies, etc.) in a context where
the real sum of those "assets" is unknown, and there
is no international regulation for containing the
movements of that enormous financial mass considered
by some to be no less than $600 trillion.
Within the controversy, the positions among those
hoping for a vigorous recovery in the United States
can be summed up as follows: those who believe that
the recovery will be anemic and will probably tend
to reproduce the virtual stagnation of the Japanese
economy from 1990 to 2005; those who are pointing to
the existence of other financial bubbles about to
burst and for that and other reasons are talking
about a "double-dip" downturn, anticipating another
dramatic fall in 2010, accompanied by high inflation
due to the massive injection of dollars in the form
of rescue packages by the Bush and Obama
administrations, the huge growth of the budget
deficit and in general, of a public debt that is
reaching a total of $12.5 trillion, almost
equivalent to the U.S. gross domestic product.
But, before advancing within that controversy, it
is worth paying attention to the social cost
accumulated to date by the global crisis, because
this is not about a technical exercise correlating
variables in a theoretical model, but the
destructive effect on persons and social wealth
provoked by capitalist crises every so often.
Higher food prices – one of the ingredients of
the current crisis – from 2005 to 2008, have taken
approximately 200 million people into extreme
poverty, while estimates for 2009 include an
additional figure of 55-90 million people pushed
into extreme poverty due to the crisis. According to
the International Labor Organization (ILO) the
unemployment rate is set to increase to 30-50
million due to the effects of the crisis.
Recent data from the FAO (Food and Agriculture
Organization) indicate that in 2009, those suffering
from hunger will rise to 1.02 million, 170 million
more than in 2007.
Finally, World Bank estimates indicate that the
crisis could result in 200,000-400,000 additional
infant deaths between 2009 and 2015, implying the
enormity of 1.4 to 2.8 million children killed by
the capitalist crisis.
On the other hand, according to a 2008 report on
world wealth, for the super-rich of the world, some
80,000 people, representing 0.001% of the population
and possessing 10% of the planet’s wealth, the
impact of the crisis has not provoked much commotion.
While in 2005 they possessed a collective wealth of
$33.4 trillion, in 2008, the figure stood at $32.8
trillion, and the most visible signs of "impoverishment"
were a drop of $1 billion in auction sales of works
of art and a fall of 21% in the sales of Lamborghini
luxury automobiles.
Observing the state of the U.S. economy we can
appreciate that an end of the recession is arguable,
even in the reduced terms in which such a thing is
understood in the conventional language of an
absence of quarterly growth, and that the road ahead
is strewn with obstacles and dangers, in no way
indicative of a vigorous recovery. What can be
observed on the horizon is the negative combination
of inflation-debt, the danger of other financial
bubbles that could burst and the possibility of a
double-dip downturn or two falls, with the second
occurring in 2010.
One of the possible courses of the crisis is
related to the vast mass of dollars being laid out
by the U.S. government in the form of rescue
packages, combined with those gaily handed out over
decades to maintain the loss-making and parasitical
functioning of that economy.
The exclusive privilege of acting as the only
country that can make imports and diverse payments
via the simple procedure of printing dollar bills,
is creating a crisis and this is being reinforced by
the injection of dollars and the general weakness of
the U.S. economy. The point at which the privilege
of the dollar becomes unsustainable is not far in
the distance.
Another serious obstacle to recovery is that the
real estate bubble which burst is not the only one.
Uncontrolled speculation, supported by the favorable
neoliberal environment has inflated other bubbles
that could burst at any moment.
One of them is the real estate bubble in non-residential
buildings, i.e. offices, supermarkets and hotels.
The crisis has hit all these activities and the
bankruptcy of supermarkets occupying large
constructive spaces has been reported, as has that
of various offices. At the end of July the
Financial Times called attention to this sector
and the possibility that it could be the next link
in the financial crisis after the real estate
disaster in the residential sector. It estimated
that $6.7 trillion of assets are compromised in this
commercial real estate sector.
Credit cards represent another bubble threat, at
an estimated one billion dollars. This so-called
plastic money has experienced a lengthy stage of
propagandistic saturation by inciting Americans to
buy on credit without rational limits, and even
encouraging them to have more than one credit card.
Speculation in relation to oil prices is feeding
another bubble, given that price movements are
strongly influenced by speculation, far beyond the
real relationship between supply and demand.
After reaching the extremely high level of $145
per barrel in the summer of 2008, the price of oil
fell to $33 in December, but since then it has risen
again to more than $70 per barrel, although that
increase does not seem to correspond to a real
economic recovery that is prompting a substantially
higher demand.
The most somber analysis of the crisis comes from
U.S. economist Nouriel Roubini, who had the merit of
being the only one from within the United States to
forecast the actual crisis in its real dimensions.
This author sustains that recovery is still barely
initial and that growth will be anemic for at least
two years.
His reasons are various: families are highly
indebted and are having to save more, and the
financial system (both banks and non-banking
entities) is much damaged. We could add that many
banks are alive thanks to governmental support, but
that they are not providing their essential service,
which is to offer credit. To date this year, 89
banks in the United States have disappeared, brought
down by the crisis. Banks considered to be in a
dangerous situation increased to 416 by the end of
the second quarter; there were 305 at the end of the
first quarter. These banks are ones that have been
degraded in their position due to liquidity problems,
levels of capital or quality of assets. As a
consequence, the lack of credit will hold back
consumption and private investment expenditure.
Another reason for anticipating an anemic recovery
is the reduction of demand at world level, and which
is diminishing in high-spending countries like the
United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and New
Zealand, and thus not increasing sufficiently to
compensate that descent in saver countries like
China, Japan and Germany. But the gravest aspect of
the crisis is the possibility of two falls (don’t
forget that in 1929-33 there were stock market rises
of up to 20% on two occasions, only to experience a
descent once again) and that there will be a second
downturn with its retinue of destruction and poverty
in 2010.
A double-dip downturn is possible because the
finalization in terms of time of governmental
stimulus and the return to a certain normality is
proceeding on a knife-edge and requires extremely
fine and precise handling. If the U.S. government
raises taxes and cuts back on expenditure – an
improbable action given growing military costs – and
combats excess liquidity, this could abort the weak
recovery. On the other hand, if it continues
accumulating deficits by gaily printing bills,
inflation will rise, the interest rate will go up
and similarly abort the recovery. Here, it should
not be overlooked that China is not in favor of
continuing to buy U.S. bonds to the same extent as
in previous stages and its government is proposing
the need the transform the international monetary
system based on the dollar.
And moreover, prices of oil and foodstuffs could
increase more quickly than those indicated by real
demand, due to speculation and a new round of very
high oil and food prices in the midst of a weak
recovery, which would likewise provoke an abortion.
Those who believe that the 2008-2009 crisis has
been left behind could have a painful awakening.
This crisis is not the same as previous ones and the
capitalism of our days is dragging too heavy a
combination of exploitation, inequality, speculation
and aggression to the environment that is making
such a recovery in economic, social and
environmental terms an impossibility.