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The failed revolution
• Betraying the organizers of the
September 4, 1933 movement of sergeants and enlisted
men, Fulgencio Batista placed it at the service of
the United States
BY JOAQUIN ORAMAS
DURING early 1933, Cuba was a country at war, in
spite of the bloody repression unleashed by the
Gerardo Machado dictatorship.
There were demonstrations, street meetings – known
popularly as “lánganas” – student strikes;
petards and other incendiary devices often exploded,
attacks against members of the regime were carried
out; the trade union movement was organizing strikes
by workers and campesinos, especially those in the
sugar, transportation, tobacco and agricultural
sectors, and who together with the great masses of
the unemployed, were shaking up the country.
At
the time, poverty began to call on the doors of the
mansions and luxury homes of Havana’s wealthy
families. Cuba was one of the countries that
suffered the most from the depression that led to
the collapse of the U.S. economy in 1929. Its
dependence on one single product – sugar – and a
single market – the United States, to which Cuba
sold more than 80% of its exportable goods –
exacerbated the suffering from the crisis on the
island.
As
the country headed for a general strike organized by
the Communist Party and other organizations, and on
observing that the Cuban powder keg was about to
explode, in early 1933 U.S. President Franklin D.
Roosevelt decided to send Benjamin Sumner Welles to
Cuba. Welles was deputy secretary of state for Latin
American affairs at the time, and a personal friend
of the president.
Among other things, the new ambassador came with
instructions to prevent a revolution hostile to the
interests of the U.S. administration. During his
mandate, he would permit Machado to continue as
president until May 20, 1935, the date ending the
“term” to which he was elected – by himself – in
1928. The traditional politicians ran to lend their
support to the mediator, and agreed to take part in
the wheeling and dealing.
The
University Student Directorate (DEU), Communist
Party and the followers of Antonio Guiteras, among
others, exposed the foreign intervention, denounced
its imperialist goals, and intensified the
revolutionary struggle.
On
August 12, 1933, Gerardo Machado, overthrown by the
actions of a large section of the Cuban people, fled
to the Bahamas, accompanied by a number of his
cronies. The previous day, the army high command, so
faithful to its leader, had withdrawn its support
for the dictator, ordering him to leave the country.
Welles was not able to get General Alberto Herrera
accepted as the new president; instead, a consensus
was reached on the designation of Carlos Manuel de
Céspedes, son of the national hero who led the first
“Cry of Independence” on October 10, 1868.
Ambassador Welles managed to convert the son of the
worthy patriot into a new puppet of the U.S.
administration, which showed its support through
U.S. Navy warships anchored in Havana’s port to
intimidate the people and prevent any revolutionary
action against the new order.
This
unpopular government lasted for only 22 days,
falling on September 4, 1933, after the popular
unrest extended to the ranks of the army, which, as
part of the social fabric, could not be immune to
the ideas of struggle; its membership was divided up
into right-wing and opposition groups and political
parties. Existing discontent in the armed forces
because of the low pay for soldiers, 24 pesos per
month; the poor state of their barracks;
insufficient clothing and shoes for troops; the
delay in implementing a 1923 law giving sergeants
the possibility of being promoted; the despotism of
officers and racism – particularly toward Blacks;
the ambitions to promotions that would be frustrated
if an expected purge of the Army were carried out,
were some of the reasons that unleashed the storm of
September 4, 1933, out of sight of the control
exercised by the Welles administration, and which
led to Céspedes being removed from office.
The
military conspiracy was initiated by Sergeant Pablo
Rodríguez, company quartermaster and also president
of the Enlisted Men’s Club. Rodríguez had obtained
authorization to hold an assembly of sergeants and
enlisted men at the Columbia Military Barracks. On
the morning of September 4, the declaration took
place with that barracks as its center. The coup,
which was not a bloody one, obtained the immediate
support of sergeants, cadets and soldiers from all
the garrisons, where the most qualified person, even
if only a corporal or lower officer, took command of
the forces. The authority of all the top officers of
the army and the navy were provisionally suspended.
The
movement was sympathetically received by the people
and progressive organizations.
Fulgencio Batista proceeded to take advantage of a
trip to Matanzas by the conspiracy’s organizer, and
using his characteristic craftiness, set himself up
as chief of the new command, in which he rose
quickly to general. His goal was to obtain Welles’
support, and he did so. The coup of September 4,
1933 brought change not only to the Army and its
traditional structure, but also to the national
political scene.
On
September 5, the “Proclamation to the People of
Cuba” was published, under the previous day’s date,
signed by more than 15 civilians and just one
soldier, Batista Zaldívar, whose signature was the
only one accompanied by the title “chief sergeant of
the Armed Forces of the Republic.” The document
stipulated the convening of a constituent assembly
and, among other things, announced that the “Cuban
Revolutionary Grouping is taking power as the
provisional Revolutionary Government.”
The
Revolutionary Grouping agreed, at the time, to
instigate a collegial form of government, for which
it created an Executive Commission of five members.
“The
Pentarchy,” as it was popularly known, disintegrated
on September 10, having lasted just five days.
As
soon as it was created, Pentarchy member Sergio
Carbó, a journalist by profession, authorized –
without the consent of anyone else – Sergeant
Fulgencio Batista’s promotion to colonel, and he in
turn proclaimed himself chief of the army.
The
100-day government emerged as an unexpected obstacle
to Summer Welles’ objectives in Cuba, but was
accepted as a lesser evil by U.S. officials in the
light of unpredictable events.
Right when the U.S. envoy believed that he was about
to fulfill all of his goals, the September 4, 1933
coup overturned an unpopular government.
Faced with the new situation, Washington immediately
proposed eliminating those who had gotten in its
way, by promoting a new puppet government and
concretizing the instructions given to Welles. The
U.S. line translated into refusing to diplomatically
recognize what was called the 100 Days’ Government;
sending a powerful fleet of 29 warships to Cuba to
pressure the regime, encouraging the opposition and
strengthening Welles’ position. It supported all the
right-wing conspiracies; and initiated, developed
and executed a reactionary military uprising, with
the brand new Colonel Batista as its strongman in
Cuba.
After the Pentarchy was dissolved on September 10,
the Columbia Revolutionary Grouping or Junta agreed
to designate Dr. Ramón Grau San Martín as the
Republic’s maximum leader. That same day, Grau took
office and designated a cabinet that included, among
others, Antonio Guiteras, appointed Secretary of
Government, who advocated revolutionary decree-laws
entailing the beginning of changes in Cuban society.
That worried the oligarchy and Washington, which
sent Ambassador Jefferson Caffery to replace Welles.
On
January 15, 1934 a military junta led by Fulgencio
Batista forced Grau San Martín to resign, dissolving
the 100 Days’ Government. One week later, the new
U.S.-backed strongman imposed Colonel Carlos
Mendieta.
A
new era of military dictatorship had begun, imposed
by Washington through its sergeant, who took over
the September 4th Movement.
The Revolution of the 30s
failed, as stated by Raúl Roa, one of its leaders
and later the Foreign Minister of Dignity of the
Revolutionary government, which made real all of its
frustrated aspirations.
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