REFLECTIONS BY THE COMMANDER
DELIBERATE LIES, STRANGE DEATHS AND AGRESSION TO
THE WORLD ECONOMY
In one of my reflections I made reference to gold
bars deposited in the basements of the Twin Towers. This time the
subject is quite a bit more complicated and hard to believe. Almost
four decades ago scientists living in the United States discovered
the Internet, the same way that Albert Einstein, born in Germany,
discovered in his own time the formula to measure atomic energy.
Einstein was a great scientist and humanist. He contradicted
Newton’s laws of physics, held sacred until then. However, apples
continued to fall due to the laws of gravity that had been defined
by Newton. These were two different ways of observing and
interpreting nature, with very little information on this in
Newton’s day. I remember what I read more than 50 years ago about
the famous theory of relativity elaborated by Einstein: energy is
equal to mass times the speed of light, called C, squared: E=MC2.
The United States money existed and the resources necessary for such
expensive research. The political climate resulting from the
generalized hatred against the brutalities of Nazism in the richest
and most productive nation in the world destroyed by the war,
transformed that fabulous energy into bombs that were dropped over
the defenseless populations of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, causing
hundreds of thousands of deaths and a similar number of people who
were exposed to radiation and subsequently died in the following
A clear example of the use of science and technology with the
same hegemonic goals is described in an article written by the
former official of United States National Security, Gus W. Weiss; it
originally appeared in the magazine Studies in Intelligence,
in 1996, even though it was more widely distributed in 2002 under
the title of Deceiving the Soviets. There, Weiss claims the
idea of sending the USSR software that they needed for their
industries, but already contaminated, with the aim of making that
country’s economy collapse.
According to notes taken from Chapter 17 of the book At the
Abyss: An Insider’s History of the Cold War, by Thomas C. Reed,
former Secretary of the United States Air Force, Leonid Brezhnev
told a group of senior Party officials in 1972: "We Communists have
to string along with the capitalists for a while. We need their
credits, their agriculture and their technology. But we are going to
continue massive military programs, and by the mid-1980s we will be
in a position to return to an aggressive foreign policy designed to
gain the upper hand with the West." This information was confirmed
by the Defense Department in hearings before the House Committee on
Banking and Currency in 1974.
In the early ‘70s the Nixon’s government advanced the idea of
détente. Henry Kissinger hoped that "over time, trade and investment
may leaven the autarkic tendencies of the Soviet system", he
considered that détente might "invite gradual association of the
Soviet economy with the world economy, and foster a degree of
interdependence that adds an element of stability to the political
Reagan tended to ignore Kissinger’s theories about détente and to
take President Brezhnev’s word, but all doubts were removed on July
19, 1981 when the new U.S. President met with President Francois
Mitterand, of France, at the economic G-7 summit in Ottawa. In a
conversation off to the side, Mitterand informed Reagan about the
success his intelligence services had in recruiting a KGB agent. The
man belonged to a section that was evaluating the achievements of
Soviet efforts to acquire western technology. Reagan expressed great
interest in Mitterand’s delicate revelations and also thanked him
for his offer to have the material sent to the United States
The dossier, under the name of Farewell, reached the CIA
in August 1981. It made it quite clear that the Soviets had been
spending years carrying out their research and development
activities. Given the enormous transfer of technology by radar,
computers, machine-tools and semi-conductors from the United States
to the Soviet Union, one could say that the Pentagon was in an arms
race with itself.
The Farewell Dossier also identified hundreds of case
officials, agents at their posts and other suppliers of information
through the West and Japan. During the first years of détente, the
United States and the Soviet Union had established working groups in
agriculture, civil aviation, nuclear energy, oceanography, computers
and the environment. The aim was to begin to construct "bridges of
peace" between the superpowers. The members of the working groups
had to exchange visits to their centers.
Besides identifying agents, the most useful
information brought by the Dossier consisted of the "shopping list"
and its aims in terms of acquisition of technology in the coming
years. When the Farewell Dossier reached Washington, Reagan
asked Bill Casey, the CIA Director, to come up with a secret
operative use for the material.
The production and transportation of oil and gas was one of the
Soviet priorities. A new trans-Siberian gas pipeline was to carry
natural gas from the gas fields of Urengoi in Siberia, through
Kazakhstan, Russia and Eastern Europe towards the western dollar
markets. In order to automate the operation of valves, compressors
and storage installations of such an immense enterprise, the Soviets
needed sophisticated control systems. They bought some of the first
computers on the open market, but when the authorities of the gas
pipeline took off for the United States to buy the necessary
software, they were turned down. Undaunted, the Soviets searched
elsewhere; a KGB operative was sent to penetrate a Canadian software
supplier in an attempt to acquire the necessary codes. The United
States intelligence, warned by the agent in the Farewell Dossier,
answered and manipulated the software before sending it.
Once, in the Soviet Union, computers and software worked in
unison and they made the gas pipeline work splendidly. But this
tranquility was misleading. Inside the software that was operating
the gas pipeline, there was a Trojan horse, a term used to describe
software lines hidden in the normal operative system which make that
system lose control in the future, or whenever it would receive an
order from abroad.
In order to affect the dollar profits coming in
from the West and the domestic Russian economy, the software for the
gas pipeline which was to operate the pumps, turbines and valves had
been programmed to breakdown after a prudent interval and reset –that’s
how it was described– the speeds of the pumps and the valve
adjustments so that they would work at pressures much higher than
those that were suitable for the pipeline’s gaskets and welding
"The result was the most monumental non-nuclear explosion and
fire ever seen from space. At the White House, we received warning
from our infrared satellites of some bizarre event out in the middle
of Soviet nowhere. NORAD (North American Aerospace Defense Command)
feared a missile liftoff from a place where no rockets were known to
be based. Or perhaps it was the detonation of a small nuclear device…They
(the satellites) had detected no electromagnetic pulse,
characteristic of nuclear detonations. Before these conflicting
indicators could turn into an international crisis, Gus Weiss came
down the hall to tell his fellow NSC staffers not to worry",
affirmed Thomas C. Reed in his book.
The campaign of countermeasures based on Farewell Dossier
was an economic war. Even though there were no casualties in terms
of lives lost because of the gas pipeline explosion, significant
damage was made to the Soviet economy.
As a grand finale, between 1984 and 1985, the United States and
its NATO allies put an end to this operation which ended with
efficacy the capacity of the USSR to capture technology at a time
when Moscow was caught between a defective economy, on one side, and
a US President determined to prevail and end the cold war on the
In the above cited article by Weiss, it is stated
"In 1985, the case took a bizarre turn when information on the
Farewell Dossier surfaced in France. Mitterand came to suspect
that Vetrov had all along been a CIA plant set up to test him to see
if the material would be handed over to the Americans or kept by the
French. Acting on this mistaken belief, Mitterand fired the chief of
the French service, Yves Bonnet."
Gus W. Weiss is the one who claimed, as already said, the evil
plan to have the defective software taken to the USSR, when the
United States had the Farewell Dossier in its possession. He
died on November 25, 2003 at the age of 72. The Washington Post
did not report his death until December 7, that is, 12 days later.
They said that Weiss "had fallen" from his apartment building, the
Watergate, in Washington, and that a forensic doctor from the
US capital had declared his death a "suicide". His hometown
newspaper, the Nashville Tennessean, published the death
notice a week after the Washington Post and advised that at
that time all they were able to say was that "the circumstances
surrounding his death have not yet been confirmed."
Before dying, he left some unpublished notes titled "The Farewell
Dossier": the strategic deception and the economic war in the
Weiss had graduated from Vanderbilt
University. He had postgraduate degrees from Harvard and New York
His work for the government concentrated on
matters of National Security, intelligence organizations and
concerns dealing with the transfer of technology to Communist
countries. He worked with the CIA, the Pentagon’s Defense Science
Board and with the Signals Intelligence Committee of the
Intelligence Board of the United States.
He was decorated with the CIA Medal of Merit and the "Cipher"
Medal from the National Security Council. The French gave him the "Légion
d’Honneur" in 1975.
He had no surviving relatives.
Weiss had declared himself to be against the war in Iraq a short
while before his "suicide". It is interesting to note that 18 days
before Weiss’ death, another Bush government analyst also committed
suicide –John J. Kokal (58 years old) on November 7, 2003. This man
leapt to his death from an office in the State Department where he
worked. Kokal was an intelligence analyst for the Department of
State in matters dealing with Iraq.
It is recorded in already published documents that Mikhail
Gorbachev became furious when arrests and deportations of Soviet
agents began in various countries, since he was unaware that
the contents of the Farewell Dossier were in the hands of the
main heads of NATO governments. In a meeting of the Politburo on
October 22, 1986, called to inform colleagues about the Reykjavik
Summit, he alleged that the Americans were "acting very
discourteously and behaving like bandits". Even though he showed a
complacent face to the public, privately Gorbachev would refer to
Reagan as "a liar".
During the final days of the Soviet Union, the
Secretary General of the Communist Party of the USSR had to work
blind. Gorbachev had no idea about what was happening in the
laboratories and high technology industries in the United States; he
was totally unaware that Soviet laboratories and industries had been
compromised and to what point.
The White House pragmatists were also blind about these
President Ronald Reagan played his trump card: Star Wars/The
Strategic Defense Initiative. He knew that the Soviets could not
compete in that league, because they couldn’t suspect that their
electronics industry was infected with virus and Trojan horses
placed there by the United States intelligence community.
The former British Prime Minister, in her memoirs, published by
an important English publisher in 1993 under the title of
Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, states that
the whole Reagan plan related to Star Wars and the intent to make
the Soviet Union collapse economically was the most brilliant plan
of that administration, and it lead definitively to the collapse of
socialism in Europe.
In Chapter XVI of her book, she explains the participation of her
government in the Strategic Defense Initiative.
To carry that out, in Thatcher’s opinion, was Reagan’s "most
important decision", and it "was to prove central to the West’s
victory in the Cold War". It "imposed more economic tension and
greater austerity" on Soviet society, and finally, its "technological
and financial implications for the USSR were devastating".
Under the subtitle of "Reassessing the Soviet
Union", she describes a series of concepts whose essence is
contained in the paragraphs taken literally from that long passage,
where she records the brutal plot.
"As 1983 drew on, the Soviets must have begun to realize that
their game of manipulation and intimidation would soon be up.
European governments were not prepared to fall into the trap opened
by the Soviet proposal of a ’nuclear-free zone’ for Europe.
Preparations for the development of Cruise and Pershing missiles
went ahead. In March President Reagan announced American plans for a
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) whose technological and financial
implications for the USSR were devastating."
"…I had no doubt about the rightness of his commitment to press
ahead with the program. Looking back, it is now clear to me that
Ronald Reagan’s original decision on SDI was the single most
important of his presidency".
"In formulating our approach to SDI, there were four distinct
elements which I bore in mind. The first was the science itself. The
American aim in SDI was to develop a new and much more effective
defense against ballistic missiles."
"This concept of defense rested on the ability to attack incoming
ballistic missiles at all stages of their flight, from the boost
phase when the missile and all its warheads and decoys were together
–the best moment– right up to the point of re-entry of the earth’s
atmosphere on its way to the target."
"The second element to be considered was the
existing international agreements limiting the deployment of weapons
in space and ABM systems. The 1972 ABM Treaty, as amended by a 1974
Protocol, allowed the United States and the Soviet Union to deploy
one static ABM system with up to one hundred launchers in defense
either of either an Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) silo
field or the national capital."
"The Foreign Office of the Ministry of Defense always sought to
urge the narrowest possible interpretation, which the Americans --rightly
in my view-- believed would have meant that SDI was stillborn. I
always tried to steer away from this phraseology and made it clear
in private and public that research on whether a system was viable
could not be said to have been completed until it had been
successfully tested. Underneath the jargon, this apparently
technical point was really a matter of straight common sense. But it
was to become the issue dividing the United States and the USSR at
the Reykjavik summit and so assumed great importance.
"The third element in the calculation was the relative strength
of the two sides in Ballistic Missile Defense. Only the Soviet Union
possessed a working ABM system (known as GALOSH) around Moscow,
which they were currently up-grading. The Americans had never had an
"Also the Soviets were further advanced in anti-satellite weapons.
There was, therefore, a strong argument that the Soviets had already
acquired an unacceptable advantage in this whole area.
"The fourth element was the implications of SDI
for deterrence. I started off with a good deal of sympathy for the
thinking behind the ABM Treaty. This was the most sophisticated and
effective the defense against nuclear missiles, the greater the
pressure to seek hugely expensive advances in nuclear weapons
technology. I was always a believer in a slightly qualified version
of the doctrine known as MAD- ’mutually assured destruction’. The
threat of (what I preferred to call) ‘unacceptable destruction'
which would follow from a nuclear exchange was such that nuclear
weapons were an effective deterrent against not just nuclear but
also conventional war."
"But I soon began to see that SDI would strengthen not weaken the
nuclear deterrent. Unlike President Reagan and some other members of
his Administration I never believed that SDI could offer one hundred
percent protection, but it would allow sufficient United States
missiles to survive a first strike by the Soviets."
"It was the subject of SDI which dominated my talks with
President Reagan and members of his Administration when I went to
Camp David on Saturday 22 December 1984 to brief the Americans on my
earlier talks with Mr. Gorbachev. This was the first occasion on
which I had heard President Reagan speaking about SDI. He did so
with passion. He was at his most idealistic. He stressed that SDI
would be a defensive system and that it was not his intention to
obtain for the United States a unilateral advantage. Indeed, he said
that if SDI succeeded he would be ready to internationalize it so
that it was at the service of all countries, and that he told Mr.
Gromyko as much. He reaffirmed his long-term goal of getting rid of
nuclear weapons entirely.
"These remarks made me nervous. I was horrified to
think that the United States would be prepared to throw away a hard-won
lead in technology by making it internationally available."
"What I heard, now that we got down to discussion of the likely
reality rather than the grand vision, was reassuring. President
Reagan did not pretend that they yet knew where the research could
finally lead. But he emphasized that --in addition to his earlier
arguments in favor of SDI-- keeping up with the United States would
impose an economic strain on the Soviet Union. He argued that there
had to be a practical limit as to how far the Soviet Union could
push their people down the road of austerity."
"I now jotted down, while talking to National Security Adviser
Bud McFarlane, the four points which seemed to me to be crucial.
"My officials then filled in the details. The President and I
agreed a text which set out the policy.
"The main section of my statement reads:
"I told the President of my firm conviction that the SDI
research programme should go ahead. Research is, of course,
permitted under existing US/Soviet treaties; and we, of course, know
that the Russians already have their research programme and, in the
US view, have already gone beyond research. We agreed on four points:
(1) the US, and western, aim was not to achieve superiority, but to
maintain balance, taking account of Soviet developments; (2) SDI-related
deployment would, in view of treaty obligations, have to be a matter
for negotiation; (3) the overall aim is to enhance, not undercut,
deterrence; (4) East-West negotiation should aim to achieve security
with reduced levels of offensive systems on both sides. This will be
the purpose of the resumed US-Soviet negotiations on arms control,
which warmly welcome.
"I subsequently learnt that George Schultz thought that I had
secured too great a concession on the American’s part in the wording;
but in fact it gave them and us a clear and defensible line and
helped reassure the European members of NATO. A good day’s work."
Later on, under the subtitle of "Visit to Washington: February
1985", Margaret Thatcher states:
"I again visited Washington in February 1985. Arms talks between
the Americans and the Soviet Union had now resumed, but SDI remained
a source of contention. I was to address a joint meeting of Congress
on the morning of Wednesday 20 February and I brought with me from
London as a gift a bronze statue of Winston Churchill, who had also
many years before been honoured with such an invitation. I worked
especially hard on this speech. I would use the Autocue for its
delivery. I knew that Congress would have seen the 'Great
Communicator’ himself delivering faultless speeches and I would have
a discriminating audience. So I resolved to practise speaking the
text until I had got every intonation and emphasis right. (Speaking
to Autocue, I should add, is a totally different technique to
speaking from notes.) In fact, I borrowed President Reagan’s own
Autocue and had it brought back to the British Embassy where I was
staying. Harvey Thomas, who accompanied me, fixed it up and,
ignoring any jetlag, I practised until 4 a.m. I did not go to bed,
beginning the new working day with my usual black coffee and vitamin
pills, then gave television interviews from 6:45 a.m., had my hair
done and was ready at 10:30 to leave from the Capitol. I used my
speech, which ranged widely over international issues, to give
strong support for SDI. I had a terrific reception."
"The following month (March 1985) saw the death of Mr. Chernenko
and, with remarkably little delay, the succession of Mr. Gorbachev
to the Soviet leadership. Once again I attended a Moscow funeral:
the weather was, if anything, even colder than at Yuri Andropov’s.
Mr. Gorbachev had a large number of foreign dignitaries to see. But
I had almost an hour's talk with him that evening in St. Katherine’s
Hall in the Kremlin. The atmosphere was more formal than at Chequers
(the official country residence of British prime ministers since
1921) and the silent, sardonic presence of Mr. Gromyko did not help.
But I was able to explain them the implications of the policy I had
agreed with President Reagan the previously December at Camp David.
It was clear that SDI was now the main preoccupation of the Soviets
in arms control."
"Mr. Gorbachev brought, as we had expected, a new style to the
Soviet Government. He spoke openly of the terrible state of the
Soviet economy, though at this stage he was still relying on the
methods associated with Mr. Andropov’s drive for greater efficiency
rather than radical reform. An example of this was the draconian
measures he took against alcoholism. As the year wore on, however,
there was no evidence of improvement in conditions in the Soviet
Union. Indeed, as our new –and first class– ambassador to Moscow,
Brian Cartledge, who had been my foreign affairs private secretary
when I first became Prime Minister, pointed out in one of his first
dispatches, it was a matter of, 'jam tomorrow and, meanwhile, no
"A distinct chill entered into Britain’s relations
with the Soviet Union as a result of expulsions authorized of Soviet
officials who had been spying."
"In November President Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev had their first
meeting in Geneva. Not much of substance came out of it --the
Soviets insisted on linking cuts in strategic nuclear weapons to an
end to SDI research-- but a good personal rapport quickly developed
between the two leaders. But he was not, which I found not at all
surprising. For Ronald Reagan had had plenty of practice in his
early years as President of the Screen Actors Guild in dealing with
hard-headed trade union negotiation, and no one was more hard-headed
than Mr. Gorbachev."
"During 1986 Mr. Gorbachev showed great subtlety in playing on
western public opinion by bringing forward tempting, but
unacceptable, proposals on arms control. Relatively little was said
by the Soviets on the link between SDI and cuts in nuclear weapons.
But they were given no reasons to believe that the Americans were
prepared to suspend or stop SDI research. Late in the year it was
agreed that President Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev- with their Foreign
Ministers- should meet in Reykjavik, Iceland, to discuss substantive
"It was that you could not ultimately hold back research on SDI
any more than you could prevent research into new kinds of offensive
weapons. We had to be the first to get it. Science is unstoppable;
it will not be stopped for being ignored. "
"In retrospect, the Reykjavik summit on that weekend of 11 and 12
October (1986) can be seen to have a quite different significance
than most of the commentators at the time realized. A trap had been
prepared for the Americans. Ever greater Soviet concessions were
made during the summit: they agreed for the first time that the
British and French deterrents should be excluded from the INF
negotiations; an that cuts in strategic nuclear weapons should leave
each side with equal numbers- rather than a straight percentage cut,
which would have led the Soviets well ahead. They also made
significant concessions on INF numbers. As the summit drew to an end
President Reagan was proposing an agreement by which the whole
arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons- bombers, long-range Cruise and
ballistic missiles- would be halved within five years and the most
powerful of these weapons, strategic ballistic missiles, eliminated
altogether within ten. Mr. Gorbachev was even more ambitious: he
wanted the elimination of all strategic nuclear weapons by the end
of the ten-year period."
"But then suddenly, at the very end, the trap was sprung.
President Reagan had conceded that during the ten-year period both
sides would agree not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, though
development and testing compatible with the Treaty would be allowed."
But Reagan suffered a strange amnesia about the triggering of the
brutal military competition that had been forced on the USSR, with
its extraordinary economic cost. His famous diary doesn't say one
word about the Farewell Dossier. In his daily notes which
were published this year, Ronald Reagan speaks of his sojourn in
"Sunday, July 19 (1981)
"The hotel is a marvelous piece of engineering,
totally made up of logs.
"Had a one on one with Chancellor Schmidt. He was really down and
in a pessimistic mood about the world.
"Following --met with Pres. Miterrand-- explained our ec. program
and that high interest rates were not of our doing.
"Dinner that night was just the 8 of us. The 7 heads of State and
the Pres. (Thorn) of the European Community. It became a really free
wheeling discussion of ec. issues, trade etc. due to a suggestion by
The final result of the great conspiracy against
the Soviet Union and the crazy expensive arms race that was imposed,
when it was mortally wounded in an economic sense is described in
the introduction of the book by Thomas C. Reed, written by
George H. W. Bush, the first President in the Bush Dynasty, who
participated in a very real way in World War II. Literally, he
"The Cold War was a struggle for the very soul of
the mankind. It was a struggle for a way of life defined by freedom
on one side and repression on the other. Already I think we have
forgotten what a long and arduous struggle it was, and how close to
nuclear disaster we came a number of times. The fact that it
did not happen is a testimony to the honorable men and women, both
sides who kept their cool and did what was right—as they saw it—in
times of crisis."
"This conflict between the surviving superpowers
of World War II began as I came home from that war. In 1948, the
year of my graduation from Yale, the Soviets tried to cut off
Western access to Berlin. That blockade led to the formation of
NATO, was followed by the first Soviet A-bomb test, and turned
bloody with the invasion of South Korea. Four decades of nuclear
confrontation, proxy wars, and economic privation followed."
"I was privileged to be President of the United States
when it all came to an end. In fall of 1989 the satellite
states of Eastern Europe began to break free, and mostly peaceful
revolution swept through Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and
Romania. When the Berlin Wall fell, we knew the end was near."
"It took another two years to close down the empire of
Lenin and Stalin. I received that good news in two telephone
calls. The first came on December 8, 1991, when Boris Yeltsin
called me from a hunting lodge near Brest, in Belarus. Only recently
elected President of the Russian Republic, Yeltsin had been meeting
with Leonid Kravchuk, President of Ukraine, and Stanislav
Shushchevik, President of Belarus. "Today a very important event
took place in our country," Yeltsin said. "I wanted to inform you
myself before you learned about it from the press" Then he told me
the news: The President of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine has
decided to dissolve the Soviet Union.
"Two weeks later a second call confirmed that the former
Soviet Union would disappear. Mikhail Gorbachev contacted me
at Camp David on Christmas Morning of 1991. He wished Barbara
and me a Merry Christmas, and then he went on to sum up what had
happened in his country: the Soviet Union had ceased to exist.
He had just been on national TV to confirm the fact, and he had
transferred control of Soviet nuclear weapons to the President of
Russia. ‘You can have a very quiet Christmas evening,’ he said. And
so it was over."
It is recorded in an article published in The New York Times
that the operation used almost all of the weapons within the
CIA's reach --psychological warfare, sabotage, economic warfare,
strategic deception, counterintelligence, cybernetic warfare-- all
collaborating with the National Security Council, the Pentagon and
the FBI. It destroyed the burgeoning Soviet espionage machinery, it
damaged the economy and destabilized the State in that country. It
was a complete success. If the opposite had happened (the Soviets
doing it to the Americans), it would have been viewed as an act of
There is another book which deals with this topic; it is called
Legacy of Ashes and it has just been published. On the book’s
dust cover we can read that: Tim Weiner is a reporter for The New
York Times. He has written on American intelligence for
twenty years, and won the Pulitzer Prize for his work on the secret
national security programs. He has traveled to Afghanistan and other
nations to investigate CIA covert operations firsthand. This is his
Legacy of Ashes is based on more than 50 thousand
documents basically coming from the very archives of the CIA, and
hundreds of interviews with veterans of that agency, including ten
directors. He reveals to us a panorama of the CIA from the days of
its creation after World War II, going through its battles during
the Cold War and the war against terrorism begun on September 11,
The article by Jeremy Allison, published in
Rebelión in June 2006, and the articles by Rosa Miriam Elizalde
which were published this year on the September 3 and 10, denounce
these events emphasizing the idea of one of the founders of free
software who pointed out that: "as technologies grow more complex,
it will be more difficult to detect actions of this kind".
Rosa Miriam published two straightforward opinion articles, each
one only 5 pages in length. If she wants to, she could write a book
with many pages. I remember her well from that day when, a young
journalist, she nervously asked me, in the middle of a press
conference 15 years ago no less, whether I thought we could survive
the Special Period that had befallen us with the demise of the
The USSR collapsed with a crash. Since then we have graduated
hundreds of thousands of young people from the higher levels of
education. What better ideological weapon do we have than the higher
level of conscience! We had it when we were a largely illiterate and
semi-illiterate people. If you really want to see wild animals, then
let instincts prevail in the human being. We could say a lot on this
In the present day, the world is threatened by a devastating
economical crisis. The United States government is using
unimaginable economic means to defend a right that violates the
sovereignty of all the other countries: to keep on buying raw
materials, energy, advanced technology industries, the most
productive lands and the most modern buildings on the face of our
planet with paper money.
Fidel Castro Ruz
September 18, 2007.