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Lawmakers linked to the Cuban American National Foundation
(CANF) are objectively the greatest allies of drug trafficking

States President Fidel Castro in Cienfuegos
Exposes manipulations to reduce the merit of island's athletes in Winnipeg

As you know, in June of 1989, our country was enmeshed in the bitter legal proceedings of Case No. 1, resulting from several comrades' irresponsible and inconceivable behavior.  Some of them showed records of unquestionable revolutionary merits and achievements. Nonetheless, they placed at risk not only the prestige and the enormous moral authority acquired over decades of heroic struggle by institutions as vital for the Revolution as the Revolutionary Armed Forces and the Ministry of Interior, but also the very security of the country. This was an unprecedented occurrence. The media covered the fully transparent public trial. Never before had a trial received so much publicity. The Council of State itself debated the appeal before the television cameras that broadcast the event to the country and the world. The viewpoints and rational of its 29 members were expressed. The agreement was unanimous. It had to be an exemplary sanction, and it was.

The situation created by the constant violations of Cuban airspace was analyzed during the trial. The three air corridors that cross over our long and narrow country are used daily by an average of 277 aircraft operated by regular airlines or other aircraft currently authorized when they comply with the prior request procedure. However, there were frequent irregular flights, at low and medium altitudes, with no prior notice or authorization whatsoever. This was precisely the way the drug traffickers' aircraft operated.

As a rule, they disobeyed any order issued by the air traffic authorities and avoided intercepting planes, even in broad daylight, using widely known wing movements in the few minutes needed to cross over the island from South to North. Once on the sea, they dropped their poisonous drug packages within or outside the 12 miles jurisdictional waters. A strong warning was called for.

On June 24, 1989, the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (MINFAR) issued a note on the subject of the country's air corridors announcing the decision to shoot at any plane that illegally entered our airspace and refused to obey orders to land for an inspection.

On June 25, the head of the United States Interests Section (USIS) in Havana presented to the Cuban Foreign Ministry a note in the form of a Non Paper. There it was stated that the US government would gladly welcome any legitimate action by the Cuban government to prevent drug trafficking within Cuba's national territory, jurisdictional waters and airspace. At the same time, it expressed concern over the decision to shoot at aircraft given the possibility of anyone failing to respond to our orders due to errors, a lack of communication or some other difficulty. They asked for moderation.

On June 25, the US Federal Aviation Administration sent a message to the Cuban Civil Aviation Agency expressing concern over the policy announced the previous day of shooting at suspicious aircraft that did not comply with orders to land.

On June 26, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher, while welcoming any legitimate action to prevent drug trafficking, called on the Cuban government to take the necessary precautions and exercise proper moderation to avoid the loss of innocent lives.

On June 27, the Foreign Ministry presented to the USIS Note 1268 in which it reiterated Cuba's firm determination to step up all possible measures to fight drug trafficking in the environs of Cuban territory, including strict observance of international over-flight regulations in accordance with Cuba's responsibility for its airspace.

On June 28, President Bush declared to El Nuevo Herald that he considered it a right decision by the Cuban government to bring officials linked to drug trafficking to trial.

In the end, the order could not be fulfilled, not even to set an example. The reason is that even in daylight, the time it takes to detect a violation by radar and transmit the information to an air base from which an intercepting plane would then take off and be guided towards the far-off point where a small target is moving, locate it with its own radar, report what it sees and wait for orders is longer than the time it takes the violator to cross the narrow national territory and enter international waters.

Additionally, to avoid risks drug smugglers usually fly by night at low altitudes, even over irregular terrain. The hundreds of thousands of dollars they are paid for each flight make them practically suicidal. Our Air Force has lost fighter planes and even lives while tracking aircraft to intercept such violations. An intensive and permanent guard service, day and night, would be ruinous; also, it would impose a tremendous drain on manpower and equipment in peacetime. Besides, under the circumstances there was a genuine risk of shooting down a plane of adventurers uninvolved in drug trafficking.

On the other hand, the United States has technically equipped aircraft with excellent communications specially designed to track down and chase planes over international waters and throughout the width and breadth of its immense territory, should they enter it, until the target either drops its cargo or runs out of fuel and is forced to land.

The intrigues would soon begin.

In July 11, the head of the USIS was summoned by the Cuban Foreign Ministry (MINREX) to receive the Note 1376, which disputed statements made by US officials on alleged drug drops on Cuban territorial waters that were not intercepted by Cuban forces. The Note specified the details of the drops on July 7 and 8 and the efforts made by our forces to locate and control them. The Note further stated that unless the United States adopted a serious and constructive stance it would not be possible to establish a sincere and effective cooperation. Likewise, it reiterated that Cuba was willing to cooperate and waiting for concrete US government proposals.

required to obtain the people's cooperation.  Sanctions against domestic trafficking had to be tightened because a domestic market was emerging.

I also explained to him what had happened with two purported Spanish businessmen. These people had established a joint venture and operated a factory here. But, their real purpose -as would later be discovered- was to send drugs to Europe through Cuba by stuffing them into the walls of containers where they imported raw materials from Colombia and sent the manufactured products to Spain. I said to him that, in the face of such deception and the risk of serious damage to the country, we were compelled to establish the most severe sanctions for large-scale drug trafficking through our country.

Allow me a digression now in this account of the events.

Actually, these two "businessmen" could have been arrested if only the Colombian authorities -in compliance with existing agreements- had informed us about the drugs that had been seized in Colombia found hidden in the walls of several containers belonging to the alleged businessmen. They simply made this information public in December.

If they had only coordinated with us, those two could have easily been arrested. But instead they made this public announcement, adding that the containers were bound for Cuba. It was an incomplete, confusing and odd report, which I analyzed also publicly on January 5, just a few days later. I was most upset that they were talking about drugs bound for Cuba and seized in Colombia as if they were talking about just any commodity imported by the country on a regular basis.  I protested that way of handling things.

The result is that those guys are still at large in Spain.  They were arrested in January and held for a few days then set free because there was no evidence against them, according to that country's authorities, to which we have offered all the necessary cooperation.  In Colombia, only the man in custody of the drugs was arrested.

They was a public response to my January 5 statement where those two individuals claimed their innocence and argued that it was all a fabrication aimed at seizing their little factory. It was just that, a cheap little factory with which they had deceived some of our people and betrayed the good faith of a Cuban entity because they had proposed an investment, a joint venture to supply the technology and market for the ornamental objects produced.

These gentlemen on whose deeds there is irrefutable evidence should have been arrested and detained in Spain, in Europe or wherever they try to hide.  If there are people serving dozens of years in prison for less serious crimes, why are these two gentlemen freely travelling in Europe?

Now, I shall continue with the story of my conversation with the American lawmaker.

After I told him about the attempt at large-scale drug trafficking through Cuba by the two Spanish citizens, I also explained to him that there had been attempts at smaller scale trafficking. That recently a group of 18 people -British, Canadian and Jamaican citizens- were arrested trying to introduce 50 kilograms of cocaine hidden in their overcoats, that they would be brought to justice and face the sanctions for small-scale trafficking, which have also been made more severe. They were somewhat lucky, since the amendments made a few months later by the National Assembly were not yet in force.

Finally, when he asked me if an anti-drug cooperation agreement between the United States and Cuba would be of much help, I told him that this island is more than 1200 kilometers long and has 5746 kilometers of coasts. Also, that I believed serious talks should be held between both countries on drug smuggling interdiction and that we wanted nothing in return, not even permission for American farmers to sell food to Cuba.  That we worked on ethical principles and had done so for 40 years despite the U.S. blockade and that we did not even ask for the lifting of the blockade as a condition.  I said that such an agreement would benefit the United States fifty times more than it would Cuba but that we would also benefit because the drugs that increasingly washed up on our coasts were harmful to us.

When he interrupted me to ask whether Cuba would allow the U.S. authorities to act in our waters or airspace, I categorically responded that it would not. I said that the United States would not accept Cuban naval or aircraft to enter its territorial waters or airspace, that such an agreement could only be reached on a reciprocal basis. I am convinced, said I, that it is ridiculous, truly ridiculous that the US government for fear of the Miami groups outcry has not signed an agreement with Cuba on drug trafficking interdiction when we were ready to do it for nothing, simply as an international moral duty.

I clearly expressed to him that three possible forms of cooperation could be established: modest cooperation, larger and more effective cooperation or a comprehensive cooperation.  That for the two first our own resources sufficed but for a highly effective comprehensive cooperation we needed some technical and communication means that were not within our reach, although we had all the skilled staff required.

In concluding I said more or less exactly the following:  "Please, ask the highest authorities in your country what level of cooperation they want, whether the present level, a higher level or the highest level possible. I simply say that we are ready for any of those degrees of cooperation. Anyway, if they are not interestedwe will still continue to do what we are doing on our own because it is our duty to defend ourselves from the damage caused by drug trafficking; it is a national interest and an international duty as well.  That was the end of that part of my conversation with him.

The Washington Post articles we already mentioned and the sensible statements made by some senior authorities, including renowned US lawmakers, caused some alarm among the counterrevolutionary mob in Miami and its Congressional allies whose electoral campaigns are funded by the Cuban-American National Foundation -a confirmed terrorist organization that in 1997 planned and funded attacks with powerful explosives on hotels in Havana.


II PART


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